DEVELOPMENT EFFECTIVENESS AND COVID-19

AFRODAD

African Forum and Network on Debt and Development

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In response to the devastating effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on African countries, development partners private sector institutions, International Financial Institutions (IFIs) mobilised financial resources to provide recovery financial support. More than $500 000,00 was mobilised to support economic recovery of countries in Africa. In view of the need to ensure that financial aid and other assistance offered the relevant and effective stimulus to the recovery efforts countries in Africa, this policy brief evaluated the affectedness of the financial support offered on the basis of the Busan High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness principles. The paper seeks to offer recommendations that will enhance the effectiveness of COVID-19 recovery interventions for Africa countries.

The findings showed that although most African countries obtained various financial flows and assistance initiatives, the implementation of the aid did not adhere to all the principles as defined by the Busan High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness. Based on the experiences of African countries this paper showed that there were implementation challenges which affected adherence and alignment of the implementation of the COVID-19 financial flows interventions to the four principles of making aid effective. The challenges include limited ownership of the COVID-19 funded projects and priorities of the aid flows, lack of transparency and mutual accountability by both the development partners and recipient countries in terms who gave money for the COVI-19 recovery interventions, how much was disbursed to the country for the COVID-19 interventions, what project or activities were funded and for what purpose? It also emerged that recipient of aid felt that the aid flows were tired to vaccines and equipment from the development partners' countries of origin and this reduced the sense of ownership. It however emerged that aid flows interventions were indeed targeted and focused on critical prevention and impact reduction aspects such as procurement of vaccines, budget support for the procurement of Covid-19 materials and equipment. However, paper showed that that there was limited use of local capacities to promote the implementation of various COVID -19 interventions. In view of these observations, the paper concludes that any form of aid whether in stable economic environment or in healthy and economic crisis can only be effective if the implementation and operationalisation of the aid is aligned and modelled along the four pillars of Aid effectiveness. In view of this conclusion, both development partners and recipient countries need to ensure that the way aid is managed and operationalized is adhering to the four pillars of aid effectiveness namely ownership of development priorities by developing countries, focus on sustainable results, involvement of recipient countries in setting up funding priorities, relying more on their country specific systems to deliver aid, promoting transparency and mutual accountability on the aid flows

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and utilisation. It is also recommended that the huge debt by most African countries needs attention to ensure that any future support to the countries is sustainable, African countries need to be shrewd in the use of local resources to support their recovery efforts rather than total dependent on aid which is offered under heavy conditionalities. Efforts by African countries to have a continental strategy to manage debt is critical since any form of conditional support in an environment of heavy distress will nor be effective in helping the countries recover from the negative effects of COVID-19 pandemic. African countries are rich in natural resources ranging from minerals, tourism and good agricultural soils and hence value addition on these resources can generate enough financial resources to address the debt challenges and put the economies of most countries on a sustainable growth trajectory.

01

INTRODUCTION

COVID-19 has exacerbated pre-existing health system issues in many African countries by interfering with routine vaccinations, the identification and treatment of various diseases, the provision of healthcare for mothers and children, and other health services. The pandemic's worsening of food shortages has resulted in extreme poverty. According to the World Bank, the pandemic has significantly reduced economic activity in Africa and forced tens of millions more people into extreme poverty. The pandemic reduced global demand and prices for Africa's mineral and oil exports, hampered trade and tourism, halted remittances from African workers abroad, and lowered GDP.

A lack of fiscal resources limited many African governments' ability to absorb the economic shocks caused by COVID19 through stimulus measures and assistance to vulnerable citizens. According to the World Bank, "budget support to people and firms" in Africa during the pandemic represented less than 3% of the region's GDP in late 2021, compared to an estimated 17% in advanced economies (World Bank 2021). According to the World Bank, COVID-19 will reduce Africa's GDP by three to eight percentage points, resulting in losses of between US$90 and US$200 billion in 2020 alone (World Bank, 2022). The UNDP (2020) also stated that the epidemic will result in the loss of nearly half of all jobs in Africa, where unemployment is already a major issue. This is expected to exacerbate Africa's already precarious economic situation, where an estimated 422 million people (or one in every three Africans) live below the international poverty line. This demonstrates that COVID 19 had a negative impact on both the economy and society in African countries. According to Mutizwa (2020), COVID-19 caused a recession in developing countries that was significantly worse than the Great Depression or World War II.

African nations have also sought assistance from organizations such as the Group of 20 (G20), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and others. Concessional loan and debt service deferment frameworks have been made available to aid African nations' recovery efforts. Africa has access to funds from organizations such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the European Investment Bank, primarily in the form of loans. According to a profile of financial assistance given to reviving African economies, the continent received significant funding to finance its economic recovery and the development of resilience to support long-term growth. Despite the fact that the financial inflows were intended to aid African nations in their recovery and keep them strong enough to begin long-term growth, questions about the effectiveness of development aid in the context of developing countries remain to mature This paper assesses the effectiveness of the more than $1 billion advanced to African nations to aid in recovery efforts following the catastrophic effects of COVID-19. The following objectives help to achieve the primary goals of this policy brief paper:

- To identify and assess the various financial flows and assistance programs made available to Africa to aid in the recovery efforts of Covid-19.
- Determine how closely these transfers and initiatives adhere to the tenets of effective African development.
- Discuss how these initiatives may affect debt.
- Evaluate the efficacy of current initiatives and flows to assist African countries in meeting COVID-19 and economic recovery demands.
- In light of the COVID-19 pandemic, propose policy changes that will improve the efficiency of development in Africa.

In this paper, the four guiding principles of the Aid Effectiveness Architecture are used to assess the effectiveness of financial flows and other types of assistance provided to African nations. The GPEDC's measurement framework was developed at the Busan High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in 2011. The four principles must be followed in order for development assistance to have a high impact.

- Ownership of development priorities by developing countries
- Focus on results
- Inclusive partnerships
- Transparency and mutual accountability

(Busani 2011, Arndt, Channing, Sam Jones, and Finn Tarp. 2015)

This paper shows that the IMF, African Development Bank, and global banks all made significant contributions to Africa's recovery efforts. According the UN (2020), financial aid was advanced to African nations for a variety of reasons, including increasing vaccination rates, revitalizing economies, and putting the continent's economies on a path to recovery. According to Gavi (2021), the World Bank and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, in particular, made significant financial contributions to the procurement and distribution of COVID-19 vaccines. Furthermore, financial resources have aided African nations in improving their Health Service Delivery (HSD) and developing strong structural and economic systems to combat COVID-19. This demonstrates the critical role that multilateral organizations and development banks have played in funding developing countries' crisis response efforts. The IMF helped several African countries to meet their urgent balance-of-payments needs through its Rapid Financing Instrument (RFI) and Rapid Credit Facility (RCF). Furthermore, through the Catastrophe Containment and Relief Trust. The IMF expanded post-catastrophe debt relief to include medical emergencies in addition to natural disasters (IMF, 2021). This demonstrates that multilateral institutions and development banks did, in fact, provide significant assistance to African nations in their recovery from the COVID 19 pandemic. However, the international community's funding was insufficient to assist African nations in recovering from the pandemic's effects and building the necessary resilience. Be that as it may, it is prudent to assess the extent to which financial resources directed to various African countries were successful in addressing the countries' social and economic needs in the aftermath of the devastating pandemic. The four aid effectiveness model is thus used to assess the efficacy of recovery aid. While some encouraging developments have been reported in a number of countries, as previously stated, country-level experiences may indicate that aid is only partially effective in addressing African nations' recovery efforts.

02

AN EVALUATION OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE COVID-19 FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE IN HELPING AFRICAN COUNTRIES RECOVERY EFFORTS

This section investigates whether financial flows to African countries adhered to the principles outlined in the aid effectiveness model.

2.1 Transparency and Accountability in the implementation of the covid-19 financial assistance for the recovery of African countries from the effects of the pandemic

Large sums of financial assistance were transferred through international financial systems by international multinational development institutions to help African countries to contain the spread of COVID-19 as well as setting up a foundation for economic and social recovery. Governments stimulus programs, multilateral loans, and debt relief were some of the aid directed to African countries. The IMF and World Bank committed $57 billion to assist Africa in dealing with the pandemic, with private creditors contributing an additional $13 billion. Nigeria received one of the region's largest IMF rapid relief loans of $3.4 billion. The South African stimulus package is valued at R500 billion ($23 billion) (IMF, 2021 and World Bank, 2021). Given the large loans and grants received by African countries, due diligence and oversight in public finance are critical. Transparency and accountability was thus critical skills that African countries required to enhance proper fund distribution and pandemic response effectiveness.

Findings reflect that despite the risk of increased financial flows, some African countries have less oversight when it comes to emergency and expedited public procurement. Uncompetitive purchases, contract awards to unknown and unqualified contractors, increased spending due to PPE and other healthcare item price exaggerations, and exclusion of SMEs from the procurement system are all examples of poor accounting and transparency prevalent in most African countries which compromised the effectiveness of the financial assistance. For instance, in order to manage World Bank and IMF loans and grants, South Africa lacked emergency PFM, procurement, and institutional architecture (World Bank, 2021). The implementation of loan purchases of medical supplies, equipment, and supplies was hampered by a lack of comprehensive emergency procurement measures. The loan and grant facilities raised concerns about accountability and transparency. It was difficult to implement the facilities using current PFM laws and regulations because the model did not allow for deviations (CABRI, 2021b). This influenced affected loan transparency. A strong crisis management or disaster risk institution that was easily accessible and well-equipped to handle the crisis immediately was required for loan and grant facilities. Research findings reflect that South Africa's loans and grants were subjected to fraud, looting, and leakage due to a lack of institutions and antiquated management techniques. The effectiveness of aid to African countries is jeopardized in the absence of reliable and effective financial management systems to manage multinational loans and grants especial in times of crisis and emergencies.

COVID-19 medicines, equipment, training, surveillance, and research grants were awarded to Nigeria, Burundi, and Angola (World Bank, 2020). There were no safeguards in place to prevent fraud and corruption when the emergency packages were distributed. Anti-corruption and civil society organizations (CSOs) have taken part in discussions about establishing mechanisms for oversight and accountability. Their oversight responsibilities were jeopardized due to a lack of monitoring mechanisms, weak institutional capabilities, and political intrusions. Financial flows were ineffective in the absence of accountability.

For safeguards and monitoring, South Africa, Algeria, and Ethiopia relied on pre-existing national institutions, particularly internal auditors and anti-corruption agencies. Existing national institutions were incapable of monitoring resource use, detecting fraud, or preventing political meddling in loan and grant administration. Most countries, including Benin, have weak institutions that lack a strong transparent and accountable framework to prevent fraud and corruption. Foreign audit firms assisted the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire in improving accountability and transparency which was a better way of enforcing transparency and accommodability (World Bank, 2021).

Several African countries collaborated with anti-corruption organizations to develop and manage emergency aid packages. This harmed transparency and accountability, given the low capacities of such institutions and their weak governance structures. In addition, such local institutions were suspectable to political manipulation ultimately leading to aid fraud reported in several countries (World Bank, 2021).

The Executive Committee on Coronavirus Response has been tasked by the Liberian Anti-Corruption Commission with reducing fraud and corruption in fund and food distribution (LACC) (LACC). In Nigeria, the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) created an anti-corruption protocol for the Presidential Task Force in charge of overseeing financial transactions and procurements, implemented corruption prevention guidelines on Covid-19 relief measures, advised frontline agencies on the management of intervention funds, and set up a monitoring team with outside observers to report abuses and offences. These examples demonstrate that some countries have attempted to be transparent and accountable when receiving COVID-19 financial assistance (World Bank, 2020).

Cameroon's police, gendarmerie, and CONAC hotlines were used to report wrongdoing in all COVID-19 related activities. Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Togo established a Twitter and social media hotline to ensure transparency and accountability in all COVID-19 related purchases and distributions. Benin has an anti-corruption agency as well as a court for economic crime. The Liberian LACC was established to investigate informant reports of emergency fund fraud. These incidents demonstrate that some African countries adopted measures to promote honesty and accountability in the management of COVID-19 funding for recovery (World Bank, 2021).

In some countries, multi-ministerial task forces managed COVID-19 funding, promoting accountability and transparency. Senior national officials oversaw national emergency package funds in some countries. Some countries, such as Cameroon, relied on pre-existing institutions for oversight and accountability, whereas others, such as Nigeria, formed special committees in response to the crisis, such as the "Presidential Task Force against Covid-19." These groups frequently include representatives from industry and government. The Permanent Secretaries of Health and Finance, the Accountant General, and the Directors General of Public Procurement, Health Services, and Internal Audit served on The Gambia's Special Committee. These structural changes increased accountability requirements (World Bank, 2020).

The fact that African countries received extrabudgetary funding from development partners without comprehensive reporting or Treasury oversight harmed accountability and transparency. Cameroon established a separate account to manage COVID-19 funding (CABRI, 2021c) (CABRI, 2021c). According to early reports, the total amount of the fund is unknown (Saadoun, 2020). (Saadoun, 2020). Because of the political climate and low public trust in government institutions, development partners have been forced to work outside of them. No appropriate accounting model exists for international aid. Transparency and accountability were compromised, diminishing the efficacy of financial aid to the majority of African nations.

South Africa, Nigeria, Botswana, and Guinea have been charged with fraud and corruption in the distribution, allocation, and use of COVID-19 emergency funds. A number of national anti-corruption organizations have received complaints about Covid-19's policies. International financial institutions lacked accountability, transparency, and oversight in the management, use, and implementation of financial assistance to African countries, as evidenced by the numerous corruption and fraud cases in COVID-19 financial support related activities. Some of the documented activities reflective of poor accountability and transparency measures by both African countries and development partners are indicated below (World Bank, 2021).

- Non-eligible beneficiaries can obtain Covid-19 illegally through the assistance of payment officials. Beneficiaries may be asked to pay a bribe in order to receive assistance.
- Theft of money and property
- Payment requests for more expensive services or goods are examples of inflated claims. Extra profit from medical supply distribution is being siphoned off; businesses receiving government assistance are not passing it on to their employees. Covid-19 emergency packages cover the loan repayments for unfairly delayed projects.
- Vaccine delivery systems were challenging to comprehend. COVAX provides equal access to all developing economies, but final distribution and delivery are unequal, and supply delivery schedules are not transparent (to ensure predictability of supplies).
- Consequently, vaccine funding was ineffective.

Nigeria provided beneficial and contracting information regarding the IMF's rapid relief loan. The Gabon Ministry of Finance consented to incorporate beneficial ownership into its oversight. Equally as important as data accuracy, timeliness, and accessibility are these guarantees. Beneficial ownership disclosure using Open Ownership Principles can help meet these standards and reduce the risk of corruption during the

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pandemic and recovery phases when allocating financial and non-financial resources and awarding contracts. These examples illustrate Africa's accountability and transparency efforts. To ensure the distribution of emergency funds in a transparent manner, ASCE-LC appointed a manager to oversee Covid-19 special packages. Monthly, the Health Minister reports to the ASCE-LC on the use of the funds. Additionally, the authority may conduct unannounced audits. More openness and responsibility (World Bank, 2021).

National Commission for Social Action manages Covid-19 (NACSA). The Sierra Leone Anti-Corruption Commission oversees these expenditures and ensures that complaints are resolved. In the country, transparency and accountability measures were implemented.

Given the current state of the legislature and oversight institutions, it may be possible to maintain emergency executive powers. During a GIFT webinar, CSOs expressed concerns about implementing COVID-19 changes (GIFT, 2020). For COVID-19 purchases, countries lacking emergency procurement laws were required to request PFM exemptions. For COVID-19-related purchases, emergency procurement measures had to go above and beyond previously established rules (CABRI, 2021b).

The Disaster Management Act of 2006 in eSwatini grants the prime minister the authority to declare a national emergency. Despite a March 2020 national emergency declaration, the emergency provisions of the current Act lack checks and balances. COVID-19 is administered by the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister in conjunction with the National Disaster Management Agency (NDMA). MEPD transfers funds to the NDMA, which then distributes them to MDAs according to the COVID-19 budget plan. Treasury pays for revenues but is not responsible for budget planning or execution. The NDMA lacks a tracking mechanism for COVID-19 funds. The IMF requested that the government be more transparent (2017 OBS score: 3/100). Without regular reporting, it will be more difficult for the MEPD, development partners, and citizens to track fund usage (Practitioner interview, eSwatini, 2021).

The response to COVID-19 required greater coordination than usual, especially between the finance and health ministries, as well as national and subnational governments (Barroy et al., 2019; Gurazada et al., 2020). In the majority of African countries, the Finance Ministry made all spending decisions. This compromised the accountability and transparency of key Ministries. The COVID-19 PF Response Monitor's frequently revised funding estimates reveal a lack of accountability and transparency. Burundi, Cameroon, and Niger nearly doubled their 2020 financing needs. Some nations met the financial requirements of COVID-19 by utilizing existing legislation (CABRI, 2020c). The South African Disaster Management Act permitted flexible COVID-19 spending. Uganda enacted two fiscal regulations based on a Fiscal Responsibility Charter that permitted economic shocks or events (Bulime & Munyambonera, 2020). The COVID-19 Emergency Response Fund in Kenya was established according to PFM regulations. In times of emergency, Ghana's procurement laws permitted sole-sourcing contracts (CABRI, 2021c). On the contrary, disaster or crisis financing laws were inconsistent. In the absence of legal provisions supporting prompt action, nations resorted to executive decision-making. At least thirty African nations have declared a public health emergency or a national disaster, granting the executive branch broad authority. This included presidential decrees, extrabudgetary COVID-19 funds, and streamlined procurement and disbursement procedures in the vast majority of Francophone nations. In order to expedite decision-making, the Togolese legislature also authorized decrees (CABRI, 2021c). Increased legislation ensured that Covid-19's financial flows were accountable and responsible.

High-ranking national officials established and distributed national emergency funds. Some countries, like Cameroon, relied on pre-existing institutions for oversight and accountability, while others, like Nigeria, formed special committees in response to the crisis, such as the "Presidential Task Force against Covid-19." These groups frequently include industry and government representatives. Members of The Gambia's Special Committee included the Permanent Secretaries of Health and Finance, the Accountant General, and the Directors General of Public Procurement, Health Services, and Internal Audit. This strategy ensured both financial inclusion and accountability. It promoted accountability and openness. Higher-ranking government officials can influence the allocation and distribution of funds, thereby reducing transparency (World Bank, 2020).

Some nations utilized local authorities to help distribute COVID-19 relief funds. The Sierra Leonean local councils provided a list of fund recipients. Multiple nations have sought the assistance of civil society organizations and/or auditors. International auditing firms aid in the administration of Côte d'Ivoire's rescue packages. In addition to enhancing accountability, these measures increased funding for planned activities (World Bank, 2021).

In some countries, transparency was promoted by increasing public awareness of emergency aid packages through institutional websites, social media accounts, and official publications. Others established hotlines to disseminate information quickly and broadly. The ECOC holds regular press briefings in Liberia. This has promoted accountability by increasing the transparency of the application of findings (World Bank, 2020).

In Africa, the lack of legislative authority has impeded efforts to improve accountability and transparency. In 74 percent of the 23 African nations surveyed, the executive can move funds without legislative approval or input (International Budget Partnership & UNICEF, 2017). Legislators in 61% of surveyed African nations face severe budget constraints (International Budget Partnership & UNICEF, 2017). Numerous African nations experienced political budget interference. Several nations attempted to implement accountability measures, but lacked the legislative authority and legislative power to use the Covid-19 special financial packages effectively. In order to meet pandemic needs, it was tempting during the crisis to disregard transparency and accountability. This went against the principles of accountability and openness.

In several African nations, accountability has been hampered by the absence of participation from key stakeholders in the implementation of financial aid to promote recovery. Some governments have enlisted the assistance of civil society organizations, which has resulted in informal accountability. Côte d'Ivoire consulted with its finance minister, banks, and labor unions prior to announcing its pandemic policy in March 2020. IMF(2020a). In the absence of standard operating procedures for engaging CSOs during crises, their ability to promote accountability and transparency was hindered (Practitioner interview, GIFT, 2021). Weak legislative, audit, and executive standards impeded the development of accountability and transparency principles and systems.

A lack of auditing and oversight has eroded international faith in the government. During COVID-19, government systems lacked credibility. WHO and other UN organizations were given funding from COVID-19. A $15 million loan from the Islamic Development Bank will be utilized by WHO and its partners (Practitioner interview, Guinea-Bissau, 2021). In countries without adequate audit and oversight, tracing and accountability were difficult.

2.2 Ownership of COVID-19 funding priorities in the implementation of the covid-19 financial assistance for the recovery of African countries from the effects of the pandemic

Loans and grants will only help developing countries recover if African countries develop, prioritize, and lead funding programs. Implement localized strategies to accomplish this.

A fiscal relief package, a focus on surveillance projects, a focus on vaccination programs, a focus on institutional sustainability, a focus on strengthening the health system, a focus on safeguarding the weak and disadvantaged from the COVID-19 pandemic, a focus on vaccine procurement, and a focus on strengthening testing capacity were all advanced to African countries. Regardless of their pandemic response needs, African countries had a limited number of funding owners. The World Bank (2022) had set aside $20 billion for vaccines in 35 African countries as of May 16, 2022. This model disregards the needs and priorities of each country. COVID-19 vaccines and other tools are being distributed differently in each country. Only seven African countries met the global vaccination target of 40% in 2021, and many believe the target of 70% by mid-2022 will not be met (World Bank, ibid). Vaccination inequity is exacerbated by reliance on donor funding and imports. This demonstrates a lack of commitment to donor-supported activities and programs. Despite increased financial support from international donors, both timing and amount have fallen short. The majority of African countries rely heavily on funding and its timing. This demonstrates a lack of program ownership. Most African countries lacked complete control over the management and control of financial support from multinational financial institutions due to poor timing of funding facilities and delays in the supply of materials and vaccines. COVAX raised $10 billion by June 2021, 15 months after the pandemic began, to buy enough vaccines for 30% of developing economies, despite delays in advance purchase agreements and vaccine deliveries (World Bank, 2022).

High vaccine hesitancy in African countries, as well as within them, reflects a lack of ownership. Resistance to vaccines and COVID-19 materials indicates a lack of national and international engagement. Higher vaccine hesitancy rates indicated a lack of trust, a lack of community engagement, and a lack of program ownership. Six out of ten people in Benin, Liberia, Niger, Senegal, and Togo refused vaccinations. Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, Ghana, South Africa, Kenya, and Sudan have all expressed concerns about efficacy, side effects, and safety. Similar results were seen in Uganda, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Mozambique, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, and South Africa. In South Africa, half of those polled believed COVID-19 was associated with 5G technology. Another South African study found that one-third of vaccine rejectors got their information from social media. In Addis Abeba, social media users were 3.6 times more hesitant than radio and television listeners (World Bank, 2022).

Vaccinations are affected by government trust. Afrobarometer found widespread skepticism in West African governments' ability to provide a safe vaccine. People were less interested in vaccines when they distrusted their government. In Ghana, 40% of those opposed to vaccination cite mistrust of the government, whereas in South Africa, vaccination rates were higher among those who liked the president (World Bank, 2021).

Vaccine acceptance is influenced by religion. In Niger and Liberia, 90% of respondents said prayer was more effective than vaccination. According to Geopoll research in six African countries, religious convictions are a major factor in hesitancy (World Bank, 2021).

Perceptions of the severity and risk of COVID-19 influence behavior. People who did not believe COVID-19 existed in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Côte d'Ivoire were less likely to immunize. If they knew someone with COVID-19, they were 13 percent more likely to accept the vaccine. Even when respondents were aware of COVID-19, they downplayed its significance.

2.3 Results on the implementation of the covid-19 financial assistance for the recovery of African countries from the effects of the pandemic

All assistance, including loans and grants, must have a long-term impact. Any COVID-19 support was expected to be based on African countries' capacities, priorities, and policies.

While most African countries had a subpar in-country delivery system, 90 percent of vaccination funding was allocated for procurement, demonstrating a lack of focus as a principle of aid effectiveness. Vaccines and supporting materials were difficult to get to and from African countries. More attention and resources were required for vaccine procurement and strengthening health systems in order for nations to have greater absorptive capacity to rapidly deploy lifesaving tools to all areas. As a result, the vaccine value chain required a comprehensive logistics management package (World Bank, 2021).

The World Bank made vaccine funding available. The World Bank will provide $12 billion to developing countries in October 2020 for COVID-19 vaccines, tests, and treatments. Other complementary activities, in addition to procurement, required funding to ensure the package's contribution to African recovery (World Bank, 2020).

A results-oriented approach was promoted by high-level committees with sole authority to direct and manage the COVID-19 response and allocate resources. Such committees were formed in Benin, Chad, Comoros, eSwatini, Mozambique, Niger, Sudan, Seychelles, and Togo. Nigeria, Gambia, and Ethiopia established committees to enhance communication with subnational governments (CABRI, 2020c). Internal coordination aided in the achievement of national objectives.

Some African countries prioritized outcomes by developing specialized solutions to problems as they arose. Ghana has accelerated fund distribution by establishing special teams to review and approve spending. While streamlining payment management, Ethiopia distributed petty cash to line ministry bank accounts and paid service delivery units in advance. Gabon's Ministry of Finance entrusted the distribution of COVID-19 health funds to a public accountant. Gambia implemented expedited expenditure approval, ex post expenditure controls, and simplified payment management (CABRI, 2021c).

Rwanda's payment systems were digitalized, allowing electronic authorizations to be submitted to the Treasury and paid at the Central Bank. To maintain payroll and cash flow, Zambia implemented remote-work policies (CABRI, 2020c). Rwanda's digital reforms have accelerated in recent years.

Africa required an effective procurement system that was focused on results. Transparency, price uniformity, onerous procedures, and wasteful spending are all common problems in public procurement systems. Several African countries purchased medical supplies quickly. The ineffective procurement systems in the majority of African countries lead to fraud, corruption, delays, and leaks. Financial flows had less impact on goal achievement due to compromised accountability and transparency (CABRI et al., 2011; Marchessault, 2020). There is no one-size-fits-all solution for intervention implementation, and there are numerous barriers in various contexts.

2022

The World Bank had set aside

$20 BILLION

for Vaccines in

35

AFRICAN COUNTRIES

as of May 16, 2022.

COVID-19

vaccines and other tools are being distributed differently in each country.

Only

SEVEN

African countries met the global vaccination target of

40%

in 2021, and many believe the target of 70% by mid-2022 will not be met (World Bank, ibid).

2.4 Building more effective and inclusive partnerships to enhance the effectiveness of the financial support to African countries

All development actors, including the private sector, global funds, middle-income countries, and civil society organizations, must form more inclusive partnerships. It suggests African nations and development partners coordinate all initiatives. All aid providers must follow the same principles and procedures to help African countries recover from the COVID-19 pandemic. Given the complexity of African countries' issues, cross-discipline, field, sector, and country collaboration is key. All stakeholders can connect and benefit from the expertise, knowledge, and activities of this shared action-oriented platform to create a strong united voice and maximize impact. It involves proactively engaging stakeholders, aligning and coordinating efforts, expanding on pre-existing collaborations, and developing solutions as a group. In 2021, the ADB received $12.9 billion from its financial partners to fight COVID-19 (ADB, 2021). Inclusion can be shown through strong partnerships, knowledge-based solutions, and financial support for developing member nations. The goal is a robust, inclusive recovery.

In Nigeria, civil society and private actors teamed up to fight COVID-19 (ActionAid, 2020). Coalition Against COVID-19 gathered local banks to mobilize funds for social protection and PPE. The UNDP-supported African Influencers for Development initiatives fought the COVID-19 pandemic, among other things. Each effort to help Nigeria was complemented by the coordination. All Nigerian recovery efforts have received more targeted, relevant help. National, municipal, and local governments must work with community and grassroots groups. If the political climate is right, local action may help hold the state accountable.

However, a study by Omar and Hani (2021) and Eh-Sokkary, et al., (2021) reflects that Egyptians were reluctant to get the COVID-19 vaccine. Despite their perceptions of the COVID-19 pandemic's severity, prevention, and safety, Egyptian respondents were unwilling or hesitant to get vaccinated. Eh-Sokkary et al. (2021) proposed a multifaceted strategy to increase COVID-19 vaccination acceptance. Oma and Hani

(2021) say most Egyptians feared COVID-19's unintended consequences. The Egyptian government did not involve local organizations in promoting COVID-19, which led to poor public reception.

Burundi's international financial aid was not inclusive. Burundi's leaders were focused on local, national, and presidential elections during COVID-19 (Kabongo and Zang, 2022). The government gave no COVID-19 facts. False pandemic rumors increased Burundians' uncertainty. Infrastructure problems affected healthcare workers. Lockdowns weren't implemented in Burundi, allowing public gatherings to continue. Political leaders were hesitant to enact virus-control regulations. Burundians resisted COVID-19 vaccines because their communities weren't involved.

Nearly half (49.9%) of Zimbabweans surveyed said they would accept COVID-19 vaccine (Mundagowa, et al., 2022). The Zimbabwean community was unprepared, afraid, and hesitant to get COVID-19 vaccinations, according to Dzinamarira et al (2021). About 76% and 55% were concerned about the vaccine's safety and efficacy (Mundagowa et al., 2022). Half were skeptical about the government's ability to provide an effective vaccine, and some said they would seek medical advice before getting vaccinated. Policymakers didn't target communities with vaccine information, education, and communication to increase vaccination uptake.

Cooper, Rooyen, and Wiysonge (2021) cite age, politics, education, employment status, and location as COVID-19 hesitation factors. The COVID-19 vaccination program in South Africa was poorly implemented due to racial discrimination, mistrust in the government, and negative perceptions of the campaign. Many country residents questioned the program's feasibility. It shows that the government couldn't identify key groups to promote COVID-19 vaccines and that there was no reliable safety data. Lack of communication about COVID-19 vaccination increased resistance.

Ethiopia's diaspora developed tools for contact tracing, data collection, and information campaigns (COVID-19 Response, 2021). Ethiopian Airlines began producing and refurbishing ventilators with foreign partners. Some African sovereign wealth and pension fund leaders announced a collaboration to digitize supply chains and trade, especially in health and agriculture.

From the above research findings, it can be noted that African governments did not include communities or various organisations that communicate with communities in the COVID-19 vaccination programme, resulting in vaccine hesitancy across the African continent. Building more effective and inclusive partnerships with the private sector and several targeted the organisations was weak among African states, hence there was no positive information about the vaccination programme.

03

FACTORS THAT AFFECTED THE ALIGNMENT OF THE COVID-19 FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO THE FOUR PRINCIPLES OF AID EFFECTIVENESS

3.1 Debt implications

The World Bank reported in 2021 that developing countries were already in debt prior to the pandemic. Even before the pandemic, African countries' debt had been steadily increasing. The continent's debt was already out of control, and the COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated it. According to a 2020 World Bank report, the pandemic triggered a fourth wave of debt crises in the majority of African countries. In African countries, the pandemic-induced global recession of 2020 resulted in the highest level of debt accumulation in many years. According to the Wiled Bank 2021 and AFRODAD 2021 reports, many developing countries were heavily indebted prior to the pandemic. To put it another way, financial assistance to mitigate the effects of COVID-19 increased debt levels. According to AFRODAD (2021), virus-caused economic shutdowns combined with a poorly mobilized domestic resource base made debt repayment difficult. As resources are immediately redirected to combat COVID-19, the continent's financial situation and debt will deteriorate. According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), only 1% of African countries mobilized in response to the crisis. Most African countries are forced to rely on grants and loans with interest rates that worsen their sovereign debt due to a lack of internal resources (OECD 2013). This implies that higher debt levels reduced the effectiveness of financial resources devoted to COVID-19 recovery efforts (UNDP 2020, AFRODAD, 2020, Babalola & Shittu 2020, Gondwe 2020).

3.2 Adequacy of the financial support to developing countries

According to the OECD, Hurley et al. (2020), and the UN, the COVID-19 outbreak increased African countries' needs and demands (2021). The health, social, and economic effects of the pandemic required additional funding. Lower export, economic, and domestic earnings The decrease diminished fiscal space. According to the United Nations, FDI and remittance inflows decreased in 2021, indicating that current initiatives and flows are insufficient to meet the new needs of the majority of African countries. Reconstruction expenditures far exceed current aid (OECD, 2020, Hurley et al. 2020 and UN, 2021). The recovery of Africa may require additional resources and initiatives. To prevent poverty and slow economic growth, bilateral and multilateral development partners must increase aid. This indicates that limited financial support for Africa's high demand diminished the efficacy of loans and grants in fostering recovery. ODA is Africa's only reliable and sustainable source of funding. It is the most important tool for pandemic responses at the national level (OECD, 2020). ODA volume must rise (G77, 2020; DAC CSO Reference Group, 2020). Maintaining 2019 ODA/GNI ratios poses a threat to the economy. Civil society organizations have urged DAC members to uphold aid effectiveness, integrity, and human rights, and to increase ODA (DAC CSO Reference Group, 2020). Africa's financial inflows and aid programs are insufficient, so the continent will not achieve its recovery objective. This requires additional funds and aid to expedite recovery (Addison, Mavrotas & McGillivaray 2005). Inequitable and infeasible borrowing conditions limit the ability of governments to borrow to create fiscal space.

3.3 Conditionality issues

As part of a loan or grant, conditions are imposed unilaterally or by mutual agreement between the lender and the recipient. In exchange for financial assistance, the recipient is required to take specific actions or produce specific results in accordance with these conditions. Conditions were imposed to ensure that African nations utilize funds effectively and ethically while achieving shared objectives. In addition, conditions were established to monitor the performance of the supported program to ensure that it met expectations and to facilitate the continuation of assistance. ensuring the repayment of loan contributions However, the terms may compromise the efficiency of development finance. Frequently, circumstances force African nations to commit to specific policy prescriptions and make political decisions regarding reform alternatives. This could undermine the principle of ownership. In addition, they increase the likelihood of an attack because they are perceived as an unwarranted intrusion into domestic affairs. It may also erode the recipient nation's confidence. The condition reduces the recipient nation's independence while potentially advancing the goals of the development partners.



04

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF DVELOPMENT FINANCIAL SUPPORT ADVANCED TO AFRICAN COUNTRIES TO RECOVER FROM THE EFFECTS OF THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC

This policy brief has shown that adherence to the four principles on Aid effectiveness was generally poor in most of the African countries. This has resulted in slow recovery in most countries. In addition, adherence to the four principles has been constrained by various structural, social and economic conditions in Africa. This paper therefore provides recommendations that will lead to higher impact and effectiveness of the financial resources channelled towards the recovery of Africa countries. This sections presents a number of recommendations which are meant to ensure country ownership, building more effective and inclusive partnerships, achieving development results and ensuring transparency and accountability.

4.1 Measures to ensure country ownership

Increased use of national resources by African countries is required to generate more domestic and continental resources for economic recovery

- A move away from donor and aid dependence syndrome is required
- Value addition of African resources is critical to develop the economies of African countries
- Africa could improve debt management and fiscal space by joining the DSSI and Common Framework.
- African Union and African countries are urged to establish rapid global risk response systems in a collective and coordinated way.
- To stop the spread of COVID-19, the African Union (AU) should encourage its members to adopt the Africa Joint Continental Strategy, establish the AU COVID-19 Response Fund, and form an African Task Force.
- A coordinated continental response to pandemics and shocks helps manage risks.
- National governments must establish local coordination to increase ownership and accountability.
- National governments must establish donor coordination frameworks to coordinate partner support behind a single national plan.

- Traditional and non-traditional contributors must align their financial support with national imperatives and plans for the system to work effectively.
- To ensure prudent debt management among African nations, a public registry for loan and debt data that covers debt across all income levels and contains tools to fully understand developing nation debt challenges is needed.

4.2 Measures to ensure effective and inclusive partnerships

- African countries must encourage local groups to join COVID-19. Publicize vaccination campaigns and other development issues. African nations must promote the private sector on the national, international, and regional levels.
- If planned correctly, the transition from development to economic cooperation can assist the continent in regaining FDI and private capital flows.
- The G20 and other development partners should organize and streamline Africa's aid and debt relief. This could involve opening more capital markets to African nations, providing more debt relief for better fiscal management, and releasing more funds to speed up economic recovery and long-term transformation (especially private sector investment). This may help their finances.
- Emerging economies (such as China) and non-state actors are a growing source of development financing for Africa; they must be included in all coordination systems.
- To improve macroeconomic, corporate, and financial frameworks, the G20 Compact with Africa (CwA) must be implemented across Africa.
- To prevent African nations from being saddled with a heavy debt burden at the conclusion of the DSSI, the G20 should grant debt cancellation requests, extend the DSSI for two more years, and pace debt payments.
- The G20 and the donor community must provide African governments with the much-needed fiscal flexibility to prioritize investments in vital economic areas so that they can build capacity to repay and achieve growth.
- Debt relief should be given in the current situation to provide opportunities for recovery and growth.

4.3 Measures to ensure achievement of development results

- Strong global donor coordination is required, according to the high-level forums on aid effectiveness held in Rome (2003), Paris (2005), Accra (2008), and Busan (2009). (2011).
- African nations must request ODA in order to finance public goods and implement development policies that will improve health standards and the continent's economic recovery.

- For the African economy to quickly recover from the pandemic, it is essential to have a strong commitment and adherence to the principles of effective aid.
- Bilateral donors must increase the budget support in the aid/development effectiveness paradigm.
- Strong global donor coordination is required for the general budget support (a key tool for supporting economic recovery in developing countries that must be adopted by development partners) Accra (2008) and Busan (2009). (2011).
- Coordination among development partners and increased ODA from significant development partners are crucial for the recovery of African economies.
- Coordination efforts and high-level funding on the continental scale must take precedence over a focus on national and sub-national measures to address domestic economic and health issues.
- Given the financial difficulties of accountability and transparency, a significant reduction in project aid and new models of development cooperation, such as trilateral development cooperation frameworks and blended financing facilities, are required.
- In addition to ODA, grants from non-traditional development partners are essential because they support the testing of innovations that are essential for bringing about economic change.
- The recovery could be sped up by development partners repurposing some funds intended for public investment to lower the risk of private projects on the continent.
- Any assistance given to African countries must prioritize better debt management in order to stimulate the continent's economies. The development of government officials' debt management abilities must be prioritized, especially those that pertain to debt audits, internal controls, and the prudent management of expenditures (the latter being a neglected area).
- It may be possible to build long-term capacity for recovery and growth if development partners heed the request for US$100 billion from African finance ministers and the African Union, which includes US$44 billion in debt relief, to support health systems, safeguard jobs, and create safety nets for vulnerable people

4.4 Measures to ensure transparency and accountability

- As a result of crises like COVID-19, African countries are encouraged to adhere to the international accountability principles. Additionally, they must demonstrate a dedication to good governance in order to be granted additional funding.
- The government's response to the challenges posed by pandemics like COVID-19 will have a significant impact on the effectiveness of the funds provided. They must remain accountable and responsible for all the recovery efforts.
- In addition, the effectiveness of the government will be evaluated in terms of its adherence to accountability, openness, and participation by the general public.

- G20 and Paris Club must support African countries by implementing the IMF's Common Framework where more focus is on building transparency and accountability capacities of countries. In addition, international financial institutions must work together to ensure that all debt relief is coordinated and better accounted for globally. A high degree of coordination between African countries and primary creditors is required for effectiveness of development assistance in terms of monitoring and controlling utilisation.
- The continent's escalating debt crisis should be addressed first, as should the continent's lack of affordable financing and the fragmentation of development partner coordination that prevents it from aligning with national economic development strategies.
- In order to assist African countries in their recovery, commercial creditors and new players in the development finance architecture may need to be highly coordinated.
- If African nations want to improve their debt management strategies and support economic recovery, they must increase debt transparency.
- For African countries to be able to contain and prevent the COVID-19 pandemic and future pandemics, greater transparency, accountability capabilities and international cooperation and solidarity are required.
- UNCAC and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development are important entry points for member states, and African countries are urged to sign on to them. This necessitates the prioritization of anti-corruption initiatives for all COVID-19 and future pandemic responses.
- To combat corruption in Africa, African countries are urged to develop, strengthen, employ, and make open data and technology widely available and accessible to all citizens. In this way, there will be proper oversight, accountability, and sound decisions.
- Legal, regulatory, and policy frameworks in Africa should be robust and inclusive, and enforcement procedures should be open, inclusive, and prepared.

Sources: World Bank 2020, Bagchi, Chandreyee, Paula Castro, and Katharina Michaelowa. 2016, Attridge, Samantha, and Lars Engen. 2019)

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